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Disability Rights and Labor:  
Is This Conflict Really Necessary?*† 
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS‡ 
The relationship between the American labor movement and identity-based social 
movements has long been a complicated one. Organized labor has often been an ally 
of civil rights struggles, and major civil rights leaders have often supported the claims 
and campaigns of organized labor. Recall the reason Dr. Martin Luther King was in 
Memphis on the day he was assassinated—to lend his support to a strike by unionized 
sanitation workers.1 But unions and civil rights groups have found themselves on the 
opposite sides of intense battles as well. These battles have included fights over race 
and sex discrimination and harassment in union-dominated workplaces (which pitted 
civil rights groups against the public-safety-worker and craft unions that themselves 
often had a history of discrimination), as well as the struggles over sex-specific 
protective labor legislation (legislation supported by a wide swath of the labor move-
ment, but that severely limited job opportunities for women).2 
The relationship between the labor movement and the disability rights movement 
is just as complicated. Organized labor has often been an ally of disability rights 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Apologies to Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 
657 (1959). 
 † Copyright © 2016 Samuel R. Bagenstos. 
 ‡ Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This Essay 
is an annotated version of the William R. Stewart Lecture delivered at the Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law on April 13, 2016. Thanks so much to Dean Austen Parrish, Professors 
Ken Dau-Schmidt and Deborah Widiss, and my other terrific hosts, as well as to the editors of 
this law journal for helping me get this piece into publishable shape. Some of the material in 
this Essay draws on briefs I drafted in Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), and Home 
Care Ass’n of America v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2506 
(mem.), 2016 WL 3461581 (2016). 
 1. Charlotte Garden and Nancy Leong nicely use Dr. King’s assassination, and the 
reason he was in Memphis, as the entry point for their argument that labor unions and civil 
rights groups share important interests. See Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, “So Closely 
Intertwined”: Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135, 1136–38 (2013). 
 2. For discussions of tensions between unions and civil rights advocates in the race and 
gender contexts, see PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 44–69 (2008); WILLIAM B. GOULD, 
BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 15–22 
(1977); SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW 
RIGHT 175–91 (2014); NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 40–42, 90–103, 275–83, 288 (2006); JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE 
IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 196–98 
(1996). On labor unions and sexual harassment, see Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and 
Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment: The Untold Story, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 
29–45 (1995). For an extensive discussion of the mechanisms by which labor organization in 
the United States has historically favored white, male workers, see Marion Crain & Ken 
Matheny, “Labor’s Divided Ranks”: Privilege and the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1542, 1567–90 (1999). 
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efforts.3 But in some of the highest-stakes battles for workers and individuals with 
disabilities, many unions and disability rights groups have opposed each other.4 
Although many commentators have written about the tensions and collaborations 
between labor unions and civil rights groups promoting race or sex equality, the very 
similar dynamics of the relationship between unions and disability rights groups have 
largely escaped comment.5 
In the past several years, though, the tensions in the labor-disability relationship 
have become especially acute. As unions (particularly the Service Employees 
International Union) have pushed for increased wages and benefits for direct-care 
workers who provide home and community-based services, and state Medicaid cuts 
have placed pressure on the budgets available to pay those workers, many disability 
rights activists have worried that labor’s agenda will lead to the (re-)institution-
alization of people with disabilities. This tension stood in the background of the 
litigation in Harris v. Quinn,6 in which the Supreme Court addressed the collective-
bargaining system some states had set up for personal-assistance workers. And the 
dispute between unions and (some) disability rights activists broke out in a 
particularly sharp and nasty way in response to the Department of Labor’s recent 
rules expanding Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) protections for home care work-
ers.7 Although some disability rights groups supported the new rules, which had been 
a major priority of organized labor, particularly vocal and influential activist groups 
opposed them—to the point of sending lumps of coal to the house of the Secretary 
of Labor at Christmas and conducting sit-ins in his home driveway.8 
These tensions are nothing new. Disability rights activists have long challenged 
the paternalism of those assigned to “help” or “care” for them, and the unions that 
represent those workers are thus a natural target for suspicion if not antagonism. And 
many (though not all) elements of the American labor movement have strongly op-
posed the deinstitutionalization of people with mental disabilities. The current labor-
disability tensions cannot be understood outside of the context of that history. 
In this Essay, I hope to do two things: First, I try to put the current labor-disability 
controversy into that broader context. Second, and perhaps more important, I take a 
position on how disability rights advocates should approach both the current contro-
versy and labor-disability tensions more broadly. As to the narrow dispute over 
wage-and-hour protections for personal-assistance workers, I argue both that those 
workers have a compelling normative claim to full FLSA protection—a claim that 
disability rights advocates should recognize—and that supporting the claim of those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. An important recent example involves a set of cases challenging Medicaid budget cuts 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In these cases, unions have often served as 
coplaintiffs with individuals with disabilities. See, e.g., M.R. v. Dreyfus, 663 F.3d 1100 (9th 
Cir. 2011), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 697 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. I did discuss some of these tensions, in a somewhat general way, in Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 
16–20, 45–49 (2012). 
 6. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
 7. See Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 78 Fed. Reg. 
60,454, 60,460–94 (Oct. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 552). 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 52–60. 
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workers is pragmatically in the best interests of the disability rights movement. As 
to the broader tensions, I argue that disability rights advocates go wrong, both norma-
tively and pragmatically, in treating the interests of individuals with disabilities as 
inevitably superordinate to those of individuals who do the work of providing 
community-based services and supports. Although this wrong turn is completely 
understandable in light of the history of paternalist subordination of people with 
disabilities at the hands of the helping professions, today’s situation calls for an 
accommodation of the legitimate claims of each side. 
I should acknowledge from the start that I do not purport to be offering the “view 
from nowhere.”9 I have worked in and around the disability rights movement for two 
decades. As a lawyer pursuing deinstitutionalization efforts that some unions have 
opposed—and as a lawyer representing disability rights organizations in supporting 
labor protections for personal-assistance workers—I have participated in some of the 
controversies I discuss here. My argument takes as a basic premise that the goals of 
the American disability rights movement—that people with disabilities should have 
the same opportunity to live in and participate as full members of the broader 
community as everyone else—state a powerful normative claim.10 I ask what stance 
people who agree with those goals should take toward the claims of workers who 
provide services to individuals with disabilities. I argue that even firm disability 
rights supporters should, in many cases, support the claims of those workers 
—including in recent disputes over unionization and FLSA protection. 
I begin in Part I by describing the conflict, both its roots in earlier fights over 
deinstitutionalization and its recent instantiations in fights over labor protections for 
attendant-services workers. In Part II, I make a normative argument for disability 
rights activists to accommodate the legitimate claims of the workers who provide 
personal-assistance services. In Part III, I make a pragmatic argument for such an 
accommodation. 
I. THE CONFLICT 
This Part introduces the conflict between organized labor and disability rights 
activists. Although that conflict has been expressed most recently in fights over 
unionization and pay protections for personal-assistance workers, it has much deeper 
roots. To understand the current controversy, one must start with those roots. I begin 
by discussing the American disability rights movement’s critique of the “helping” 
professions, a critique that, at an ideological level, underlies the skepticism many 
disability rights advocates have toward the unions that represent members of those 
professions. I then discuss the role of public-employee unions, particularly the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), in 
opposing the deinstitutionalization of individuals with mental disabilities. Finally, I 
turn to the more current controversy. I show how the realities of Medicaid budget 
politics, combined with the suspicions that linger from prior conflicts, lead disability 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. The obligatory cite is to THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986). 
 10. On the diverse goals of the participants in the disability rights movement, and the core 
consensus on equality, empowerment, and integration, see SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND 
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12–33 (2009). 
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rights advocates to worry that efforts to improve the pay of personal-assistance work-
ers will limit opportunities for people with disabilities to live full, independent lives 
in their homes and communities. 
A. The Disability Rights Movement, the Critique of Paternalism, and the Creation 
of Consumer-Directed Personal-Assistance Services 
For many American disability rights activists, the principal engine of disability 
inequality has been paternalism. Nondisabled individuals, particularly parents and 
members of the professions, have treated individuals with disabilities as the objects 
of charity and pity. Although this treatment often stemmed from generous impulses, 
the result was to confine persons with disabilities to lives as perpetual sick people, 
with services designed to care for them rather than to promote opportunities for 
individuals with disabilities to make and realize their own choices about how to live 
their lives.11 
This paternalism was often fed by widespread stereotypes about disability. In 
particular, perceptions of individuals with disabilities are marked by what scholars 
have called the “spread effect”—the (perhaps implicit or unconscious12) assumption 
that persons who experience limitations on performing some tasks are broadly in-
competent to act and choose for themselves.13 Indeed, for many disability rights 
activists, it is these stereotype-driven attitudes, combined with social decisions about 
how to design structures and institutions, that in fact create disability by making 
particular physical or mental impairments disabling.14 
As it coalesced in the last third of the twentieth century, the American disability 
rights movement devoted much of its effort to countering these stereotypes and to 
fighting the paternalism of parents and professionals.15 Movement adherents argued 
that law and policy should be premised on a social model of disability—in which 
disability is created by the interaction between a physical or mental condition and 
hostile or inaccessible attitudes or environments.16 They pushed for policy ap-
proaches that would promote independence and integration of people with 
disabilities—approaches that centered on civil rights laws rather than charity or 
medical care.17  
Movement adherents recognized that people with disabilities might rely on 
services or supports to participate fully in society, but they advocated for service 
delivery models that would promote independence and integration. “Independence,” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (2004). 
 12. On implicit bias and disability, see Dale Larson, Comment, Unconsciously Regarded 
as Disabled: Implicit Bias and the Regarded-As Prong of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 451 (2008). 
 13. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 
397, 423–24 (2000); Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic 
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 779 (2007). 
 14. See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 426–36. 
 15. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 1010–12 (2003); Bagenstos, supra note 11, at 13–14. 
 16. See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 428–30. 
 17. See Bagenstos, supra note 11, at 10–18. 
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for participants in the American disability rights movement, had a particular mean-
ing. It did not consist in the ability to perform tasks without help—what you might 
call physical independence—but instead in the ability to make effective choices 
about how to live one’s life.18 These choices stem from the most major decisions 
about how to construct one’s life projects all the way to the most mundane day-to-
day decisions about what kind of snack to get from the fridge, and when to do so. If 
a person with a disability can make these life choices, big and small, and make them 
stick, then she is independent in this sense even if she must rely on the assistance of 
others to put these choices into effect (by helping her get dressed for work, for exam-
ple, or by physically fetching the snack from the refrigerator).19 
This latter understanding of independence, which you might call decisional 
independence, occupies a central place in the thinking of most American disability 
rights advocates.20 Many of these advocates developed the model of consumer-
directed personal-assistance services to put the ideal of decisional independence into 
practice.21 “Personal-assistance services” is the phrase that these advocates decided 
to use to describe what others would call home-based care. The idea is that “care” is 
something that elevates the caretaker above the person who is being taken care of, 
and that it treats the cared-for person as simply an object, rather than as a subject 
with projects of her own. “Assistance,” by contrast, highlights the important principle 
that it is the disabled person whose projects and choices matter; the worker is there 
to assist her with realizing them.22 The model of consumer direction puts that 
principle into practice: by requiring the personal assistant to do what the disabled 
person—and not a family member, treatment provider, or anyone else—wants her to 
do at any given moment, and by giving the disabled person the power to hire, fire, 
and otherwise control the working conditions of the assistant.23 
Under the model of consumer-directed personal-assistance services, individuals 
with disabilities who need assistance with basic activities of daily living receive that 
assistance in their own homes and communities from workers whom they can hire 
and fire, and whom they could direct on a day-to-day and even minute-to-minute 
basis. Relying on consumer-directed personal assistance, in the view of disability 
rights activists, serves the independence of individuals with disabilities. Those who 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See Bagenstos, supra note 15, at 991–1000. 
 19. See id. at 992–93. 
 20. I owe the term “decisional independence” to Elias S. Cohen, What Is Independence?, 
GENERATIONS, Winter 1992, at 49. See also Adrienne Asch, Disability, Bioethics, and Human 
Rights, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 297, 313 (Gary L. Albrecht, Katherine Seelman 
& Michael Bury eds., 2001) (arguing that “independence need not be viewed in physical 
terms” but instead that “self-direction, self-determination, and participation in decision mak-
ing about one’s life are more genuine and authentic measures of desirable independence”). 
 21. See Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance Services: “Most Integrated 
Setting Appropriate” Requirements and the Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care, 27 
AM. J.L. & MED. 17 (2001); Andrew I. Batavia, Gerben DeJong & Louise Bouscaren 
McKnew, Toward a National Personal Assistance Program: The Independent Living Model 
of Long-Term Care for Persons with Disabilities, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 523 (1991); 
A.E. Benjamin, Consumer-Directed Services at Home: A New Model for Persons with 
Disabilities, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 80. 
 22. See Batavia et al., supra note 21, at 530. 
 23. See Batavia, supra note 21, at 19; Batavia et al., supra note 21, at 530. 
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perform personal-assistance work are essentially tools to achieve the ends chosen by 
the individuals with disabilities themselves.24 
B. Deinstitutionalization and Organized Labor 
It is not hard to see how the ideological critique of paternalism might have brought 
disability rights activists into conflict with labor unions that represented profession-
als who provide services to individuals with disabilities. The very concrete effort to 
shift power from service providers to disabled consumers necessarily sharpened the 
tension. But conflict came from the union side as well. Public-employee unions—
particularly AFSCME—were the major opponents of disability rights advocates’ ef-
forts in the 1970s and 1980s to end the confinement of people with mental disabilities 
in institutions.25 
Deinstitutionalization has been an urgent priority for disability rights activists. As 
Justice Ginsburg explained in her opinion for the Supreme Court interpreting the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to prohibit unnecessary institutionalization, 
confining individuals with disabilities to institutions feeds the stigma attached to 
disability at the same time that it denies institutionalized individuals the opportunity 
to participate as full members of the community: 
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from 
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons 
so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life. 
Second, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday 
life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, 
work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and 
cultural enrichment.26 
Although the number of people with mental disabilities in state-operated institutions 
has dropped substantially in the past fifty years, thousands remain in those facili-
ties.27 And thousands more individuals with mental or physical disabilities are 
institutionalized in privately or state-operated nursing homes and other settings. De-
institutionalization, thus, has remained a centerpiece of disability rights advocacy. 
As deinstitutionalization efforts picked up speed in the 1970s, public-employee 
unions were typically their principal opponents. Although those same unions had 
often been responsible for bringing to light the institutional abuses that catalyzed 
deinstitutionalization litigation,28 their opposition to deinstitutionalization should 
hardly have been surprising. State-operated institutions for individuals with disabili-
ties were (and have remained) heavily unionized, while most of the programs that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See, e.g., Batavia et al., supra note 21, at 529 (describing the assistant as “an extension 
of the disabled person”). 
 25. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 18–20. 
 26. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600–01 (1999) (citations omitted). 
 27. For statistics, see Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 8–9; Margo Schlanger, Anti-
Incarcerative Remedies for Illegal Conditions of Confinement, 6 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. 
L. REV. 1, 24 (2016). 
 28. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 17–18. 
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provide services to those same individuals with disabilities in their homes and 
communities are nonunion workplaces.29 Unions can be expected to fight efforts to 
shift work from unionized to nonunion workplaces. Indeed, they would be properly 
subject to criticism if they did not fight those efforts. 
And unions fought deinstitutionalization not simply out of an immediate effort to 
protect union jobs in institutions. They also feared the political agenda of de-
institutionalization. Although disability rights advocates believed that institutions 
should be replaced by robust public services provided in the community, crucial sup-
port for deinstitutionalization came from fiscally conservative state politicians.30 
Those politicians sought to use deinstitutionalization as a tool for budget cutting and 
disinvestment in public services. Efforts at deinstitutionalization thus threatened both 
specific union jobs in existing institutions and the more general project of public 
service provision to which public-employee unions were committed.31 
Deinstitutionalization, and the priority disability rights activists placed on it, thus 
stoked powerful suspicions between those activists and labor unions. And those 
suspicions have not gone away. As I note in Part I.C, some union and disability rights 
groups have worked together to find ways of reconciling each other’s interests in this 
area. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) has been particularly 
forward-looking in supporting disability rights while fighting for the interests of its 
members.32 But a strong undercurrent of conflict remains. In those states that con-
tinue to maintain large populations of individuals with disabilities in state-operated 
institutions—not coincidentally, these tend to be heavily unionized states—efforts at 
serving those individuals in their homes and communities continue to provoke sharp 
responses from AFSCME and related unions.33 
C. The Current Controversy 
To a large extent, disability rights forces won the earlier conflicts over 
deinstitutionalization. Home- and community-based services now make up the 
majority of Medicaid spending on long-term care services.34 Many more people with 
disabilities receive services in their homes and communities than in state-operated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. See id. at 18–19. 
 30. See id. at 20–21. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 48. 
 33. See id. at 47. 
 34. See STEVE EIKEN, KATE SREDL, BRIAN BURWELL & PAUL SAUCIER, TRUVEN HEALTH 
ANALYTICS, MEDICAID EXPENDITURES FOR LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (LTSS) IN FY 
2013: HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES WERE A MAJORITY OF LTSS SPENDING (2015), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/long-term-services 
-and-supports/downloads/ltss-expenditures-fy2013.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20160829213353 
/https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/long-term-services 
-and-supports/downloads/ltss-expenditures-fy2013.pdf]; JENNIFER RYAN & BARBARA EDWARDS, 
HEALTH AFF., REBALANCING MEDICAID LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (2015), 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_144.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/6FKE-ERQN]. 
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institutions.35 And people with disabilities and their families now expect and demand 
that they not be forced into institutions to receive needed services. 
But those disability rights victories have set the stage for the current controversies. 
The workers who provide home- and community-based supports to disabled people 
are part of what has been described as the “fastest-growing” employment sector in 
the United States—the so-called home-care sector.36 According to Bureau of Labor 
Statistics projections, employment in the home-care sector is expected to grow by 
more than fifty percent in the decade leading up to 2024—eight times faster than 
employment in general is expected to rise.37 And wages for workers in that sector are 
extremely low. According to the National Employment Law Project, “[i]n 2013, the 
country’s two million home care workers had average annual earnings of $18,598. 
Average annual earnings for all wage and salary workers in the United States were 
$46,440.”38  
This state of affairs raises serious moral concerns: Is it fair to treat any workers 
this way? Do these wages reflect the importance of personal-attendant work to its 
clients and society? Does such low pay for workers who provide home- and 
community-based services limit the effectiveness of those services and thus compro-
mise our nation’s promise to the people with disabilities whom we have freed from 
unnecessary institutionalization? And the concerns extend beyond the register of 
morality. When many personal-assistance workers depend on public assistance to 
make ends meet,39 that places pressure on public budgets.40 
The increasing importance of the personal-assistance sector also creates an 
organizing opportunity. Jobs providing direct services to people with disabilities in 
their homes cannot be sent to right-to-work states or overseas.41 And the workers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 48–49 (“The overwhelming majority of people with 
disabilities are no longer served in large state institutions, and, as a practical matter, they never 
again will be.”). 
 36. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, GIVING CAREGIVERS A RAISE: THE IMPACT OF A $15 
WAGE FLOOR IN THE HOME CARE INDUSTRY (2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads 
/2015/03/Giving-Caregivers-A-Raise.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y55B-FNHM].  
 37. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Projections—2014-24 
(Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/V3PQ-WCJS] (presenting, in Table 3, more than 760,000 “home health care” jobs predicted 
to be added to the 2014 base of just over 1.26 million, for a compound annual growth rate of 
4.8%, which is eight times greater than the .6% compound annual growth rate Table 2 predicts 
for employment as a whole). 
 38. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 36, at 1 (footnote omitted). 
 39. See id. at 2 (“A significant number of home care workers rely on public assistance 
because their earnings are not enough to make ends meet. Among home care workers, nearly 
50 percent live in households that receive public assistance benefits such as Medicaid, food 
stamps, and housing and heating assistance.”). 
 40. See KEN JACOBS, IAN PERRY & JENIFER MACGILLVARY, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY CTR. 
FOR LABOR RESEARCH & EDUC., THE HIGH PUBLIC COST OF LOW WAGES (2015), 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2015/the-high-public-cost-of-low-wages.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/MMB6-EECT]. For a general discussion of the harms that low-wage work exacts on 
our economy, see Nick Hanauer, Confronting the Parasite Economy, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 
2016, at 34. 
 41. See EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS 
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who do these jobs have very legitimate complaints about their wages and working 
conditions. Although it was historically very difficult to organize workers who were 
so geographically separated from one another, the SEIU and the AFSCME developed 
techniques for doing so.42 
The increasing success of SEIU and AFSCME in organizing home-services 
workers has inevitably led to conflicts with disabled activists. The conflict has fo-
cused on two big issues. The first is control: Who controls what a personal-assistance 
worker does during work time? The second is money: How will increased wages for 
personal-assistance workers, in an age of limited resources, affect the access of peo-
ple with disabilities to their services? These conflicts have drawn on, and at the same 
time fed, disability rights activists’ longstanding distrust about the agenda of unions. 
These conflicts play out directly in legal and policy fights concerning the structure 
for unionizing attendant-services workers. As SEIU and AFSCME proceeded with 
their efforts to unionize workers in this sector, disability rights activists understand-
ably feared a loss of control over the most intimate, day-to-day choices in their lives. 
They feared, in particular, that unions would work out the terms and conditions of 
personal-assistance employment with the state (which pays for these services through 
Medicaid) or with private home-care agencies. Such a result would cut to the heart 
of the “Independent Living” philosophy that so much of the American disability 
rights movement has endorsed.43  
After extensive organizing and negotiations, disability rights and labor groups 
eventually worked out a representation mechanism that would take account of the 
interests of both disabled persons and the workers who served them.44 The workers 
would have the right to organize and bargain collectively with the state over the 
dollars-and-cents aspects of work that the state controlled, but the individual clients 
                                                                                                                 
 
IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE 185 (2012) (“Care work organizing was never easy, 
but it seemed more promising than unionizing any of the declining sectors. . . . Capital flight 
and offshore production reshaped manufacturing and business services, like data processing 
and sales, but care work was among those jobs—health care, distribution and transport, janito-
rial and hotel, retail and restaurant, security, and personal services—that, we have noted, were 
harder to export.”). See generally Tyson B. Roan, Anything but Doomed: Why Restrictions on 
Offshoring Are Permissible Under the Constitution and Trade Agreements, 13 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 209, 211 (2009) (“With the mass exodus of manufacturing jobs in the U.S., 
unions, such as those in the Change to Win Federation (CTW), are now turning their efforts 
toward organizing the service sector.”). 
 42. For a nice analysis, see Nari Rhee & Carol Zabin, Aggregating Dispersed Workers: 
Union Organizing in the “Care” Industries, 40 GEOFORUM 969 (2009). 
 43. See supra text accompanying notes 18–24. On the especial importance of control to 
disability rights advocates, see JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: 
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with disabilities would retain the power to choose their own personal assistants and 
to direct their work on a day-to-day and minute-to-minute basis. This reconciliation 
involved important concessions on both sides, and it would not have occurred with-
out longstanding and deep relationships between labor and disability rights activists 
in California.45 The model soon spread from California to a number of other states.46 
But that model of representation ultimately got caught up in more general 
antiunion politics. From the union perspective, a crucial aspect of the California 
model was that it allowed all personal assistants providing a particular sort of services 
within a state’s Medicaid program to join together in a single bargaining unit—and 
that the union would be empowered to both bargain with the state and collect a fair-
share fee from all of the workers in the unit it represented. In Harris v. Quinn, right-
to-work groups challenged the collection of agency fees under such arrangements.47 
When Harris got to the Supreme Court, there was a bit of a controversy within the 
disability community concerning what position disability rights activists should take. 
Collective bargaining limits managerial prerogatives, and in the case of attendant 
services, it is the people with disabilities who are, in some sense, the managers. As a 
result, some within the disability community favored the position of the antiunion 
groups.48 But many others took the view that disability rights activists should defend 
the compromise they had so painstakingly worked out with the labor movement. I 
represented a broad array of disability rights groups from across the country who 
took this view, and we filed a brief in support of the unions’ position in the Supreme 
Court.49 But the Supreme Court in its 2014 Harris decision rejected that position,50 
and we are still working out precisely what the fallout will be.51 
Another arena in which these conflicts play out is the application of the FLSA to 
personal-assistance workers. The conflict here is obviously about money. If standard 
wage-and-hour rules apply to personal-assistance workers, it will be more expensive 
to hire them.52 But the conflict is also about control, because overtime protections 
may force individuals with disabilities to hire more personal assistants than they 
would prefer.53 For years, exclusions in the FLSA had been read to exempt most 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. See Rhee & Zabin, supra note 42, at 973. 
 46. See BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 41, at 205–09. 
 47. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
 48. See Janine Bertram Kemp, Harris v. Quinn Case Dividing Disability Community, 
Unions, INDEPENDENCE TODAY, Feb. 2014, at 3, http://www.itodaynews.com/pdf/issue_45.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N662-8F8Y]. 
 49. See Brief of the American Ass’n of People with Disabilities et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Harris, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 11-681), 2013 WL 6907715. 
 50. See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2634–44. 
 51. For criticism of Harris shortly after the decision, see Harold Pollack, The Supreme 
Court Would Prefer People with Disabilities Receive Care from Disgruntled, Low-Wage, 
High-Turnover Workers, NEW REPUBLIC (June 30, 2014), http://newrepublic.com/article 
/118489/supreme-courts-harris-decision-hurts-disabled [https://perma.cc/Y85M-RW2Q]. 
 52. See Corrected Brief for ADAPT and the National Council on Independent Living as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 6, Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 
(D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2506 (mem.), 2016 WL 3461581 (2016) (No. 15-
5018), 2015 WL 1534374, at *6. 
 53. See id. at 7–8, 2015 WL 1534374, at *7–8. 
2016] DISABILITY RIGHTS AND LABOR  287 
 
attendant-services workers from the full protection of the statute.54 Unions and 
worker advocates had increasingly pressed to narrow these exclusions. In the 2007 
Coke case,55 the Supreme Court held that the decision to narrow these exclusions was 
up to the Department of Labor. President Obama took office shortly after the Coke 
decision, at a time when using the Department of Labor’s power to solve the problem 
stood as a major union priority.56 
When the Department began to move on this issue, it took some steps that raised 
especial concern among disability rights advocates. The Regulatory Impact Analysis 
submitted with the Department’s proposed rule blithely suggested that a result of the 
new rules would be the reinstitutionalization of some people with disabilities.57 Dis-
ability rights activists, led by the direct action of the organization known as 
ADAPT—the most aggressive grassroots disability rights organization58—protested 
the Department of Labor building, shutting down its entrances.59 They even protested 
at Secretary of Labor Tom Perez’s house and sent lumps of coal to his home mailbox 
at Christmas.60 
The Department, nonetheless, finalized the regulations, and a trade association of 
home-care providers immediately filed suit. ADAPT, the National Council on 
Independent Living, and other disability rights organizations supported the lawsuit, 
which was successful in the District Court for the District of Columbia.61 On appeal 
to the D.C. Circuit, the American Association of Persons with Disabilities (AAPD) 
—a group made up of, by, and for people with disabilities—filed an amicus brief in 
support of the Department of Labor regulations.62 (I served as their counsel on the 
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brief.) That filing created a major conflict within the disability rights community 
—and indeed led to the spectacle of one disability rights group (ADAPT) organizing 
the protest of another (AAPD).63 Spurred by that controversy, the Secretary of Labor 
issued a letter that emphasized that states—which finance the bulk of attendant ser-
vices for disabled persons—must implement the new rules in a way that protects the 
rights guaranteed by the ADA.64 
The D.C. Circuit upheld the regulations, and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.65 Disability rights groups—both those who supported and those who op-
posed the new regulations—are now closely monitoring the implementation of those 
regulations to ensure that they do not cause adverse effects on people with dis-
abilities. In some key states—notably California—implementation seems to have 
gone relatively well for both disabled persons and the workers who serve them.66 In 
others—notably Illinois—aggressive state-level austerity politics have interacted 
with the new regulations in a way that has clearly harmed individuals with dis-
abilities.67 
II. THE NORMATIVE ARGUMENT 
We can expect that interest groups will pursue their own particular ends in the 
political process. There is nothing to criticize in that. But that does not mean that a 
group’s claims should be immune from normative assessment. All the more so, I 
would suggest, when the group is a social-justice movement. The fundamental goals 
of the disability rights movement, most attractively understood, are not to elevate 
disabled persons above the nondisabled, but to achieve equal citizenship status.68 
When the claims of disability rights advocates bring them into conflict with another 
social-justice movement, such as the movement to empower workers, it is both 
appropriate and necessary to engage in a normative evaluation of those claims—one 
that takes seriously the interests on both sides. 
That is true not just for a “detached observer”—should such a person exist—but 
also for movement participants themselves. Participants in a social-justice movement 
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are doing more than simply waging a war to serve their own interests. They are claim-
ing a place in the broader community, seeking access to the community’s processes 
of mediating between the interests of different groups and individuals, and calling on 
that community to respond to their claims based on principles that transcend particu-
lar interests. It is thus normatively essential for social-justice movement actors to 
take fair account of the interests of other groups when making their claims. 
In this Part, I offer a normative assessment of the claims of disability rights 
movement actors who have lined up in opposition to organized labor groups. I argue 
that the claims of disability rights movement actors were righteous in the effort to 
promote deinstitutionalization and build community-service systems, and that those 
claims properly trumped the interests of unions in maintaining the existence of the 
congregate institutions in which their members worked. But opposing the continued 
existence of congregate institutions is a very different thing than opposing the exten-
sion of basic worker protections—such as minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and 
collective-bargaining requirements—to the individuals who provide services and 
supports in community settings. Where these basic worker protections are concerned, 
the normative case for allowing disability rights interests to trump is much weaker. 
A. The Normative Argument for Deinstitutionalization 
When union groups opposed deinstitutionalization in the 1970s and 1980s, they 
defended their opposition based on concern for the welfare of individuals with dis-
abilities.69 In those instances in which union groups oppose deinstitutionalization to-
day, they tend to make the same arguments. I believe these arguments have been 
offered in all good faith. But there is no denying the strong self-interest that unionized 
workers had in opposing deinstitutionalization. Public, congregate institutions for 
disabled persons are typically unionized workplaces; the providers of community-
based services, who are generally private entities, are typically not. As union density 
in the private sector has declined, and public-sector unionism has become relatively 
more central to the American labor movement, the closure of large, unionized, 
public-sector workplaces can be understood to pose a particular threat to labor. 
And—as today’s controversies highlight—the wages for workers in public institu-
tions have tended to be significantly higher than those in community-based settings. 
So simply out of the interests of their members, one would expect public-employee 
unions to oppose deinstitutionalization.70 
Overall, the opposition to deinstitutionalization has largely been vanquished. The 
combination of civil-liberties litigation and budgetary politics in the 1970s and 
1980s, aided by the adoption of the ADA in 1990 and the Supreme Court’s 1999 
Olmstead decision—not to mention the continued refinement of successful models 
for providing community-based services and supports—has turned American policy 
decisively against the institutionalization of individuals with disabilities, even as 
some pockets of resistance remain.71 And American policy has been right to turn 
against institutionalization. Disabled Americans live better, freer, fuller lives; are 
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more centrally a part of the community; and can more effectively enjoy full and equal 
citizenship when they are not forced to live apart from the rest of us, in facilities 
limited to people with disabilities.72 
As against the interest of hundreds of thousands of individuals with disabilities in 
living full lives as part of the community, the interest of workers in maintaining spe-
cific jobs in specific institutions should carry much less weight. If the choice were 
stark—a full life for people with disabilities or good jobs for workers who provide 
them services, and you can’t have both—it would be a tragic one. Even then, though, 
I would be hard pressed to say that the interests of a group of workers in good jobs 
outweighed the human cost of keeping a group of people in institutions. 
Fortunately, we do not face such a stark choice. Disabled persons do not need to 
be kept in institutional confinement in order to ensure that service workers have good 
jobs; the state can ensure that the workers who provide community-based services 
are just as well compensated and treated as the workers in institutions. And, though 
Harris v. Quinn places some limitations on how a state can achieve this end, the state 
can also create structures to facilitate the organization of community-service workers 
into unions that they select, and it can engage in collective bargaining with them. The 
most visionary architects of deinstitutionalization, from disability rights activists, to 
government officials, to some union leaders themselves, have sought to structure 
community-based services in ways that will ensure that the workers who provide 
those services have stable, well-paying jobs.73 That was the genesis of the arrange-
ments that have led to our current controversies. Certainly, if it’s possible to serve 
both the interests in disability equality and worker protection, there is no reason to 
choose the latter over the former. And to choose the certain continued institu-
tionalization of disabled persons to avoid the risk of weakening worker protections 
is not to accommodate the interests of people with disabilities and the workers who 
serve them; it is to sacrifice the interests of disabled persons entirely to those work-
ers. That is not a sacrifice disability rights activists could ever be expected to endorse, 
nor should they be. 
But, of course, union leaders who opposed deinstitutionalization offered an 
argument that was framed in terms of the interests of people with disabilities them-
selves. I have discussed that argument at length in other work.74 For this Essay’s 
purposes, I would simply note three points. First, as I have summarized in my other 
work, the evidence shows that on balance deinstitutionalization has been far better 
for disabled persons than institutionalization. That is true even when fully consider-
ing the real harms that some people have experienced after deinstitutionalization. 
Second, when harms have occurred after deinstitutionalization, they have resulted 
precisely from the failure to invest in adequate and appropriate community-based 
services. We know how to serve people with even the most significant disabilities in 
their own homes—and how to do so in ways that promote full lives and equal 
membership in the community. That our governments have at times failed to put their 
money behind that knowledge is not an indictment of deinstitutionalization but of 
that failure to invest. Finally, note that the argument supporting institutionalization 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. See id. at 13, 47–48. 
 73. See supra text accompanying notes 44–46. 
 74. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 5. 
2016] DISABILITY RIGHTS AND LABOR  291 
 
here is the essence of paternalism. To tell disabled people that they must live in 
segregation, but that it’s for their own good, is not to treat them as equal citizens with 
an equal right to determine their own interests. It should hardly be surprising that the 
disability rights movement rejected that admonition.75 
B. The Normative Argument for Worker Protection 
The very success of the movement for deinstitutionalization means that the 
current iteration of the disability rights–labor conflict has very different normative 
stakes. Where opposition to deinstitutionalization places the interests of disabled per-
sons in a subordinate position to those of the workers who provide them services, 
opposition to labor protections for those workers places the interest of disabled per-
sons in a superordinate position. But both people with disabilities and the workers 
who serve them have important interests that a just society should take into account. 
Indeed, the precise reason that deinstitutionalization did not present a tragic choice 
between the interests of these two groups was the prospect that workers who provide 
community-based services could receive adequate protections. Opposition to those 
protections would unnecessarily transform deinstitutionalization into a conflict be-
tween disabled persons and the workers who provide them services. 
Although far too many people with disabilities remain institutionalized, the 
overall trend is clear: The overwhelming majority of disabled Americans who re-
ceive services and supports receive them—and will continue to receive them—in the 
community.76 And although there are periodic efforts, from opinion elites and grass-
roots lobbyists, to reverse the tide of deinstitutionalization, there is little reason to 
believe that the trends of the last fifty years will in fact be reversed.77 
But disability rights activists legitimately fear that labor protections for the 
workers who provide community services will impede the move toward freedom and 
integration of people with disabilities. For one thing, collective bargaining by per-
sonal assistants threatens to upend the consumer control that is so central to 
independent living. The more that working conditions of those providing 
community-based services are subject to negotiation, the less control that the dis-
abled person has over what happens in her day-to-day life. Given the importance of 
these day-to-day choices to independence and equality, and the often extremely inti-
mate tasks that personal assistants must perform, many disability rights activists are 
understandably wary of allowing collective bargaining into the relationship. That is 
particularly true because ceding control to those who provide services to disabled 
persons seems to mark a return to the paternalism of the helping professions that was 
a principal target of the independent-living movement. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. See supra text accompanying notes 11–17 (describing strong antipaternalist commit-
ments of the American disability rights movement). 
 76. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 48–49. 
 77. For recent calls to return to institutionalization, see Dominic A. Sisti, Andrea G. Segal 
& Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Improving Long-Term Psychiatric Care: Bring Back the Asylum,  
313 JAMA 243 (2015); Christine Montross, The Modern Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/18/opinion/the-modern-asylum.html [https://perma.cc 
/8VYC-APW7]. For a response, see Harold Pollack & Samuel Bagenstos, We Don’t Need 
“Modern Asylums,” AM. PROSPECT, Summer 2015, at 18. 
292 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:277 
 
But the choice is hardly so dire. As I described earlier, disability rights activists 
and union leaders, working together, were able to develop a unique model of collec-
tive bargaining that accommodates the key interests of both individuals with dis-
abilities and their assistants. That model leaves control over day-to-day working 
conditions, and hiring and firing, with the disabled person, while it empowers the 
workers to band together to negotiate with the state over dollars-and-cents matters 
such as wages—matters that generally turn on state decisions in any event, as it is 
the state that typically pays for personal-assistance services through Medicaid. Given 
the availability of this accommodation of interests, opposition to collective-
bargaining rights must rest on a determination that any interest of people with dis-
abilities must necessarily take priority over all interests of the workers who serve 
them. Just as when workers placed their interests above those of disabled persons in 
their opposition to deinstitutionalization, that is a position that has little to be said for 
it normatively. 
The controversy over wage-and-hour protections implicates not just the question 
of control, but the question of whether personal-assistance services will remain avail-
able. By granting attendant workers overtime-pay rights, the Department of Labor’s 
new regulations will either make personal-assistance services more expensive or 
require some disabled individuals who had previously employed only one attendant 
to now employ two or more. To the extent that personal assistance becomes more 
expensive, people with disabilities—and the state Medicaid programs that often are 
the ultimate payors—will become less able to afford it. The result will be that dis-
abled people do not receive the services that are necessary for full and equal 
participation in the community. In many cases, an individual with a disability will be 
able to get by with less-than-full service coverage. But in others, the cutbacks may 
make the difference between being able to stay in the community and effectively 
being forced to enter an institution to receive necessary supports. In its regulatory 
impact analysis of its original home care rule proposal, the Department of Labor 
suggested that the rule would result in some reinstitutionalization, though the benefits 
would outweigh those and other costs.78 It’s therefore no surprise that many disability 
rights activists responded so harshly to the proposal. 
Even if individuals with disabilities can avoid the extra costs of overtime by 
capping each individual worker’s hours and hiring more of them, that step itself has 
costs. Individuals with disabilities rely on personal assistants to carry out their most 
basic, private, day-to-day choices. It is difficult to find workers who can reliably 
perform these tasks in a trustworthy manner. When a person must look for two or 
more such workers, the task may be impossible. 
But there is another side to the story. The workers who provide personal-
assistance services have the same interest in receiving fair pay—and in having time 
for other commitments in their lives, their families, and their communities—as do all 
workers.79 The wage-and-hour protections of the FLSA are the principal way that 
our society has chosen to protect workers’ interests in fair pay and time away from 
work. To be sure, those protections have never reached all workers. In part this is 
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because of political compromises—like the exclusion of agricultural and domestic 
workers. But these compromises have drawn great criticism, and appropriately so. 
Many of the jobs excluded from FLSA coverage, like agricultural and domestic jobs, 
are those that have often been performed by women and minorities. And the mainte-
nance of male domination of family economic life—and of white supremacy in the 
Jim Crow South—were key goals of those who pushed for those exclusions.80 
As a normative matter, we ought not to make exceptions to FLSA protections 
except in two general circumstances: First, where there is a good reason to think that 
a class of employees does not need the statute’s wage-and-hour protections, an 
exemption may be appropriate. The statute’s “white collar” exemptions are an exam-
ple of this category—or at least they would be if the earnings threshold were set high 
enough.81 The lower minimum wage for tipped workers also is sometimes justified 
in this way, though accumulating evidence suggests that workers who come within 
that exemption in fact have a particularly strong need for protection.82  
Second, where there is something about the class of employment—whether about 
the job, or about the people who are performing the job—that makes it economically 
unsustainable to provide full FLSA protections, and there is some particular reason 
why it is important that the class of employment exists, an exemption may also be 
appropriate. The overtime exemption for firefighters in small departments is plausi-
bly an example.83 Many have sought to justify the minimum-wage exemption for 
certain disabled workers in these terms, but disability rights advocates have in recent 
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years aggressively urged that that exemption is not in fact justified—with increasing 
success in persuading policy makers.84 
An overtime exemption for personal-assistance workers clearly does not fit the 
first category. Workers who provide attendant services are often poor, they often 
must work second jobs to feed their families, and they often are members of dis-
empowered minority and immigrant groups.85 If anyone has a need for the wage-and-
hour protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act, these workers have a strong claim. 
Does the exemption fit the second category? I don’t think so. Granting the 
importance of personal-assistance work to the independence and empowerment of 
people with disabilities, there is nothing economically unsustainable about providing 
full FLSA protection to those who do that work. Because the money to pay personal 
assistants who serve disabled persons largely comes from the state, the basic question 
is one of political will. If we decide to invest in an adequate attendant-services sys-
tem, we can readily operate it while according workers their basic protections. 
But perhaps that is an idealistic response. In the world we have, political pressures 
are conspiring to cut, rather than invest in, Medicaid. Disability rights activists can 
join with workers’ advocates to urge increased investments. Until that effort suc-
ceeds, some degree of conflict between the interests of people with disabilities and 
the workers who serve them may be inevitable. But there is no good normative basis 
for preferring one side of the conflict over the other. For both disabled people and 
attendant-services workers define groups that experience some significant dis-
advantage and have a valid claim on social goods. 
III. THE PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT 
Having read up to this point, you might agree that there are important interests on 
both sides here. But, you might say, all that shows is that there is a conflict; it doesn’t 
show how that conflict ought to be resolved. After all, regardless of which side we 
favor in any particular policy choice, we may well be, at the margins, favoring one 
legitimate interest over another perfectly legitimate interest. And that’s particularly 
true in our fallen world, where we are quite far from implementing the ideal set of 
arrangements that could in fact accommodate the legitimate interests of both warring 
sides here. 
In this last Part, I will move from the idealistic register of normative analysis to a 
more hard-headed pragmatism. I will argue that, for two pragmatic reasons, disability 
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rights advocates will better serve the interests of the disability rights movement by 
advocating for employment-law protections for personal-assistance workers. One 
reason has to do with labor markets; employment-law protections can be crucial to 
attracting and retaining high-quality attendant-services workers. The other reason has 
to do with politics. The disability rights movement needs allies, and the labor move-
ment can be a very helpful ally in arguing for the expansion of the services on which 
disabled people rely to promote full inclusion in the community. 
Start with labor markets. We know that consumer-controlled personal-assistance 
services are a key tool for achieving independence and integration for disabled peo-
ple. But adequate personal-assistance services depend on having a stable labor force 
of people willing to serve as personal assistants. And individuals with disabilities 
have often found it difficult to attract and retain workers for those positions. One set 
of researchers found that “[c]onsumers of PAS [personal-assistance services] con-
sistently report difficulty in recruiting and retaining personal assistants.”86 Others 
have described attendant-services positions as marked by “unacceptably high rates 
of vacancies and turnover.”87  
As a result of this labor-market “churning,” many disabled individuals are unable 
to find people willing to provide personal-assistance services.88 Even when disabled 
individuals can find workers, frequent turnover means frequently facing the burden 
of identifying, hiring, and training new attendant-services workers.89 High vacancy 
and turnover rates thus have what one set of researchers calls “a profoundly negative 
effect on consumers’ ability to achieve full community integration.”90 And they place 
many individuals with disabilities at risk of reinstitutionalization.91 
And why are there such high vacancy and turnover rates for personal-assistance 
positions? Because too few workers are willing to do these jobs at the rates they are 
paid.92 Attendant-services work is stressful and grueling, and many people will 
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choose not to do it if they can find better-paying alternative jobs. An array of studies 
finds that low wages and poor benefits are the most significant reason for the churn-
ing in this part of the labor market.93 
Increased wage protections and unionization can therefore serve the interests of 
people with disabilities by stemming the turnover among personal assistants. Re-
duced turnover is exactly what we have seen in states that have provided collective-
bargaining rights and wage increases to attendant-care workers.94 At least this is true 
when they have not sought to comply on the cheap. When states have imposed strict 
hourly caps on personal-assistance work, as Illinois has recently, they have actually 
harmed the interests of both workers and disabled people.95 But when states have 
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taken increased wages as an occasion for increased investment in community ser-
vices, the result has been a win-win. As a purely pragmatic matter, then, disability 
rights advocates should favor worker protections—not just to serve the interest of the 
workers, but to serve their own interests. 
But there is more to the pragmatic argument than just policy wonkism. As some 
of my discussion to this point suggests, the political landscape facing disability rights 
advocates these days is a particularly challenging one. As the disability rights move-
ment has recognized that public services, along with civil rights, are crucial to 
promoting integration and empowerment for people with disabilities, it has 
repeatedly confronted the incredibly harsh budget politics of our current era. We live 
in an era of austerity, particularly at the state level.96 Medicaid, which finances 
personal-assistance services for disabled persons, is one of those entitlement pro-
grams, and it is perpetually threatened by cuts at the state and federal level. Indeed, 
the political pressures on Medicaid have only increased with the adoption of the 
Affordable Care Act97—which dramatically expanded the program—and the 
Supreme Court’s National Federation of Independent Business decision98—which 
made the expansion optional for each state.99 Many states with Republican-controlled 
legislatures refused to participate in the expansion, and the entire controversy high-
lighted the political pressures on the Medicaid program as a whole.100 
In a world like this, disability rights advocates need allies. And unions can be 
important allies in the effort to defend and enhance spending on programs like 
Medicaid. When disability rights advocates defend the rights of workers in Medicaid 
programs, that cements an alliance with the representatives of those workers to de-
fend and expand those programs. In the end, the answer to the problem of limited 
resources is not for disability rights activists and labor to fight increasingly pitched 
battles over allocation of a smaller and smaller pie. The only answer is to engage in 
political activism that will increase the resources that the state devotes to community-
based services for people with disabilities. Increased resources will promote the 
independence and full citizenship of disabled Americans at the same time it provides 
stable and well-paying jobs for personal-assistance workers. And the only way to 
engage in successful advocacy on this front is for people with disabilities and the 
labor movement—the interests that gain the most from expanded investments—to 
work together. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, I hope to have shed light on an interesting and important conflict 
between the disability rights and labor movements. Disability rights activists fought 
long and hard to obtain freedom from institutionalization, and independent living in 
the community. Robust protections for the workers who provide personal-assistance 
services understandably may seem to threaten the availability of those services and 
the key principle of consumer control. But disability rights activists should none-
theless work to accommodate the legitimate interests of those workers. The success 
of the independent-living project may depend on it. 
